and Congress has not waived the sovereign immunity of the United States for damage suits to remedy constitutional violations.
Scholars have argued that where the federal government has violated the Constitution, the Supreme Court should abrogate sovereign immunity in the absence of congressional action and create a damage remedy directly against the federal government.' 2 In the generation since Bivens, however, no court has adopted these scholars' proposals, and sovereign immunity continues to block damage actions against the federal government when past constitutional violations are alleged.' 3 A number of incidents of wide-scale abuse of fundamental rights by the federal government have become public since Bivens was decided, 14 13. Sovereign immunity has its greatest force in the modern context where a plaintiff seeks damages after discovering that a constitutional violation has occurred. See Pullman Constr. Indus. v. United States, 23 F.3d 1166, 1168 (1994) ("The only portion of the United States' original immunity from suit that Congress continues to assert is a right not to pay damages."). A number of avenues exist, of course, to challenge the constitutionality of legislation prior to or during enforcement, see, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (striking down Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994), for exceeding congressional power), and executive action, see, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1994) (waiving federal sovereign immunity for relief other than damage actions).
14. In addition to the HRE, government actions that have emerged in the past 25 years include, among others, This Note will argue that while the general reluctance of the Court to abrogate sovereign immunity is founded on sound policy considerations, that reluctance is inappropriate when the federal government undertakes a policy that constitutes a mass and systematic violation of constitutional rights. Where it is clear that the normal oversight mechanisms of the political process have failed, and certain threshold conditions are met, 1 6 the Court should create a cause of action against the government.
Part I of this Note explains why the present system does not allow individuals to recover damages against the federal government for violations of the Constitution. It first describes the doctrine of constitutional torts and its limitations. It then discusses sovereign immunity, and explains that Congress has retained sovereign immunity for constitutional torts. It concludes with a discussion of the Supreme Court's policy arguments for not creating a cause of action against the government for constitutional violations.
Part II explores the Human Radiation Experiments as a case study in the remedial gaps created by the current scope of Bivens and sovereign immunity. It discusses the particular constitutional torts arising out of the HRE. It then attempts to demonstrate that the HRE as a whole represent a type of constitutional violation that is different in kind, not just in degree, from typical Bivens cases. It concludes that this category of cases can be better analogized to the law of torts governing large-scale injuries, labeling it "constitutional mass torts." Finally, Part III argues for judicial abrogation of sovereign immunity for these constitutional mass torts. It notes that the political branches have not acted to provide a remedy for HRE victims, leaving it to the courts to vindicate their rights. Next, it discusses the power of the Supreme Court to alter the current regime of sovereign immunity. Finally, building on the case study and responding to concerns discussed in Part I, the Note concludes with a series of threshold criteria which, if met, can guide the Court to limited, but necessary, action.
I. CONSTTUONAL TORTS AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNrTY
The Supreme Court first recognized a cause of action for damages against federal officials under the Constitution in 1971 in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 17 Despite this decision, plaintiffs in Bivens suits have been prevented from recovering against officials under this cause of action by a series of substantive and procedural hurdles,' 8 and some have thus sought a remedy against the 16. This Note proposes certain criteria that limit the range of possible claims in which a cause of action against the government should be allowed. See infra Part III.0. nity, however, prevents aggrieved plaintiffs from recovering against the United States. 2 0 The Supreme Court has been unwilling to abrogate sovereign immunity for constitutional violations in the absence of a waiver by Congress, citing concerns about protecting the incentive that Bivens liability creates for individual officials and respecting the role of Congress as the appropriate institution for creating new liability for the federal government.
2 '
A. Constitutional Torts: Liability of Government Officials for Violations of the Constitution
This section lays out the Supreme Court's jurisprudence of damage remedies for constitutional violations. Beginning with Bivens, it explains the rationale of the Court in creating the cause of action, and the ways in which it has developed by analogy to traditional common law torts. This section then explains that the combination of an interpretation that limits the situations in which the violation of constitutional protections will yield a damage remedy and a series of procedural hurdles has prevented most potential Bivens plaintiffs from recovering. Rev. 1362 Rev. , 1364 Rev. (1953 (discussing the ability of Congress to control federal jurisdiction).
The first indication from the Supreme Court that it could create such a remedy came decades earlier, in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), a case involving alleged violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. There the Court stated that "where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief." Id. at 684. The Court in Bell, however, did not exercise the power it discussed, holding only that the district court had improperly dismissed plaintiff's complaint for lack ofjurisdiction, and remanding to determine whether the Fourth and Fifth Amendments had been violated, and, if so, whether damages were the proper remedy. See id. at 684-85. See generally Alfred Hill, Constitutional Remedies, 69 Colum. morning of November 26, 1965, six federal narcotics officers entered Webster Bivens's apartment and arrested him for alleged narcotics violations. 2 3 They manacled him in front of his wife and children, threatened to arrest his entire family, took him to a federal courthouse, and interrogated him. 24 Bivens was released without being charged. Had the Bureau of Narcotics tried to prosecute Bivens, Fourth Amendment doctrine likely would have made any evidence gathered pursuant to the agents' search inadmissible. 25 Because no prosecution went forward, Bivens sought the only available remedy: damages. When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court, citing Marbury v. Madison 26 for the proposition that the "very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury, '2 7 found a cause of action against the federal narcotics officers directly under the Fourth Amendment. 28 The Court reviewed the long-standing power of the federal courts to create legal remedies, 29 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S. C. § 1983 (1994 Justice Harlan, in concurrence, elaborated on the rationale for the Court's decision to create a new cause of action. 3 3 ForJustice Harlan, the question concerned the necessity, and not merely the advisability, of creating a remedy. As he stated, it is apparent that some form of damages is the only possible remedy for someone in Bivens' alleged position. It will be a rare case indeed in which an individual in Bivens' position will be able to obviate the harm by securing injunctive relief from any "subconstitutional" decisionmaking that derives its power from the traditional ability of federal courts to create interstitial remedies in federal statutory schemes. Concerns about creating a cause of action when Congress had not acted were mitigated by the judiciary's "particular responsibility to assure the vindication of constitutional interests." 3 5 Justice Harlan argued that the Bill of Rights was meant to protect individuals in the face of popular will; if the popular will, as expressed in Congress, failed to provide an avenue for vindicating constitutional rights, it was appropriate for the judiciary to craft a remedy. 
The Development of Constitutional Torts by Analogy to Traditional
Common Law Torts. -When the Court concluded that a damage remedy was the appropriate relief to grant Webster Bivens, it built upon the foundation of common law torts to define the scope of the constitutional action. Ever since, traditional tort law has infused the law of constitutional violations in areas ranging from the question of whether to create liability for a particular constitutional provision to the scope of the relief to be granted if a cause of action is found. 3 and magnitude of injury necessary to accord meaningful compensation for invasion of Fourth Amendment rights.
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The valuation of damages is an illustrative example of an element of a constitutional tort that derives from common law torts. 4° In Carey v. Piphus, the Supreme Court decided that students denied procedural due process while being suspended were only entitled to recover "nominal damages not to exceed one dollar." 4 1 The Court quoted a torts treatise for the proposition that damages should only compensate persons for actual injuries, not for the mere deprivation of rights. 4 2 Carey, then, tied the remedy for a deprivation of constitutional rights to the same questions of valuation that arise in the context of personal injury and similar traditional actions, despite the clear conceptual difference in the types of harm represented by each violation. 43 On a practical level, the types of claims that predominate in constitutional torts litigation have helped link the emergence of this doctrine to traditional individual to individual torts. The overwhelming majority of constitutional tort claims arise out of "street-level" contact with low and mid-level officials carrying out governmental programs in the day-to-day course of business. 44 It is natural in that environment for courts to have drawn on the elements of traditional private liability to define the nature of the relevant injury in constitutional torts. 45 3. The RetreatfromJudicial Action After Bivens. -Courts have defined the elements of constitutional torts, then, have squarely within the traditional understanding of common law torts. As will be seen, however, tort law itself has undergone significant changes as it has faced liability generated by institutional actors. 46 The significance of the connection between common law torts and constitutional torts will be explored in Part 39. Id. at 409 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan then noted in a footnote that arguments from judicial competence would vary with the nature of the constitutionally protected interest. See id. at n.9 (Harlan,J., concurring). In other words, causes of action arising from some constitutional provisions would more closely mirror the types of claims with which judges were familiar from the common law context than those arising from others. 43. In the case of traditional torts, the harm to be compensated for is actual injury, while in the case of constitutional torts, the injury derives from governmental abuse of power that may or may not have concrete consequences for the victim. See Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 808-10 (1986) (holding that damages based on abstract "importance" or "value" of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in constitutional tort actions).
See Davis
44. See Schuck, supra note 22, at 60-61 (describing the work environment in which most government tort liability is generated).
45. See Whitman, supra note 37, at 225. 46. See infra text accompanying notes 178-188.
II, but it is important first to understand the limitations of the Bivens cause of action. Bivens held out the brief promise of a new jurisprudence of constitutional remedies. At first, the Supreme Court and various circuit courts found the principle of Bivens applicable to other provisions of the Bill of Rights. 4 7 Soon, however, the Court began narrowing the scope of possible Bivens actions, giving greater weight to the two grounds available for defeating such claims, special factors counselling hesitation and adequate alternative remedies, 48 increasingly emphasizing deference to legislative and executive prerogatives. 49 In Chappell v. Wallace, 50 the Court refused to find a cause of action for enlisted military personnel alleging unconstitutional racial discrimination on the grounds that both the conditions of military service and the constitutional grant of authority to Congress over the military justice system 51 constituted "special factors" sufficient to defeat the claim. 5 2 Even an implied desire by Congress to preempt constitutional remedies was found to overcome a plaintiff's potential Bivens claim. In Bush v. Lucas, the Court declined to find a cause of action under the First Amendment for a federal employee who alleged that he had been demoted for making public statements critical of his agency. 53 The Court found that the administrative remedy Congress had created for employment disputes was a sufficient "special factor" 54 to defeat the cause of action, despite the fact that existing remedies did not provide as complete a level of relief as The Court declined to find a Bivens remedy on the ground that the Social Security disability system represented a complex series of policy compromises with which the Court was hesitant to tamper.
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All told, Bivens now applies in a relatively narrow band of cases in which Congress has provided no remedy, or has no constitutional grant of specific authority sufficient to signal the need for particular judicial deference. eral officials would be shielded from personal liability unless they violated a constitutional provision whose meaning they knew or reasonably should have known was clearly established at the time of the violation. 62 Lower courts, applying the subjective element of this test, allowed plaintiffs to question officials about intent and state of mind. As a consequence, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Court held that the qualified immunity defense would turn solely on an "objective" examination of what a reasonable official would have known at the time of the violation, and that such an inquiry should occur prior to any discovery, allowing courts to dismiss cases before exposing government officials to the burdens of preparing for trial. 63 In both Butz and Harlow the Court was concerned with the potential burden on official action. 64 The Court in Butz argued that there is a great need "to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority." 65 b. Procedural Obstacles to Recovery Under Bivens. -Courts presented with Bivens suits construe jurisdiction, venue, and other preliminary litigation issues in favor of government officials, creating additional burdens for'plaintiffs. 66 Furthermore, any determination that a Bivens action survives a motion to dismiss is appealable on an interlocutory basis, 67 and given the -concern that the functioning of government should not be overly burdened by the threat of personal liability for government officials, courts regularly stay all discovery until such appeals are concluded, further delaying any recovery. 7 0 This is not to say that all federal employees lack financial resources, but rather that those who implement policies or act in ways that violate the Constitution are not the best situated to redress any resulting injuries.
In sum, the Court created a right of action in Bivens that has been circumscribed both by the level of deference given to Congress and the procedural hurdles created by the reluctance of courts to burden the executive.
B. The Doctrinal Framework of Federal Sovereign Immunity
Given the limitations of the Bivens cause of action, it might seem natural to seek a damage remedy against the government, rather than against a particular official. Sovereign immunity, however, prevents such a remedy. Sovereign immunity, simply put, is the common law doctrine that a government cannot be sued absent consent. This section explores the roots of sovereign immunity, and its nature as a common law rather than constitutional doctrine.
7 ' It then notes that Congress has largely waived the immunity of the United States, but that, in seeking to protect policymaking discretion and the ability of the executive to exedute the laws unfettered by the burden of excessive litigation, it has retained immunity for constitutional torts.
1 Sovereign immunity was first addressed by the Supreme Court in 1793, in Chisholm v. Georgia. 78 Faced with the question of whether Article III allowed jurisdiction in a suit against a state, four of the five justices on the Court found Georgia amenable to suit in its sovereign capacity, absent consent, indicating a sharp break with traditional monarchist conceptions of sovereignty. 7 9 In 1794, Congress, reacting to the widespread 72. See Schuck, supra note 22, at 36. Professor Amar asserts that sovereign immunity, and the vesting of discretion to waive the doctrine in Congress, is inconsistent with the founders' understanding of popular sovereignty. He argues that the "single idea" of popular sovereignty "informs every article of the Federalist Constitution, from the Preamble to Article VII." See Amar, supra note 12, at 1439. To Amar, the Constitution reflected a conscious decision to reject the English conception of sovereignty as King-inParliament, and was instead modeled on the corporate examples of the early colonial compacts and state constitutions. Amar finds support for this concept of popular sovereignty in Madison's Federalist No. 46:
The federal and State governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different powers, and designed for different purposes. The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have lost sight of the people altogether in their reasonings on this subject; and to have viewed these different establishments not only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled by any common superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities of each other. These gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They must be told that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone .... 
79.
Chief'Justice Jay noted the distinction between England's feudal system and the fledgling American system of popular sovereignty. He concluded that such feudal notions as not being able to subject the sovereign to suit in his own court did not "obtain here; at the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the country, but they are sovereigns without subjects... and have none to govern but themselves; the citizens of America are equal as fellow citizens, and as joint tenants in the sovereignty." Id. at 471-72; see also Schuck, supra note 22, at 45 (discussing the concept of popular sovereignty expounded in the opinions of ChiefJustice Jay and Justice Wilson).
fear of the vulnerability of states to suits for debt, proposed the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, which sought to withdraw from the federal courts jurisdiction over suits against a state by citizens of another state. 84. In order to provide a mechanism for policing the excesses of the government despite sovereign immunity, courts in the United States, like their English counterparts, developed a complex jurisprudence of officer suits. In Lee, for example, the Court allowed an ejectment action by a titleholder against two federal officials who had charge of the Arlington, Virginia estate of General Robert E. Lee's wife, which the United States government had purchased after an alleged failure to pay a tax assessment. See Lee, 106 U.S. at 197; Jaffe, supra note 71, at 23. The Court allowed the action, even though it affected property in the possession of the federal government. See Lee, 106 U.S. at 223.
The Common Law Origins of Sovereign
Immunity. -As the development of sovereign immunity in the United States indicates, the doctrine has a common law, rather than constitutional, foundation.
8 5 Although some members of the Supreme Court have stated that sovereign immunity can be found in the Constitution, 8 6 nothing about the immunity of the government to suit appears in the text of the Constitution.
8 7 The Court has generally made no pretense of finding a constitutional basis for sovereign immunity, but has instead invoked its long tradition. 8 8 Justice Holmes rationalized the doctrine of sovereign immunity on the "logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." 8 9
While this may be true of federal statutory causes of action, the Constitution is the "authority that makes the law" in constitutional torts claims, not Congress. 90 In other words, the source of the authority of Congress and the executive to act is the Constitution, and, since Marbury v. Madison, 9 1 the Court has had the power and the duty to review those actions-legislation or execution of the law-through the lens of the Constitution. Admittedly, the long tradition of reviewing acts of Congress and the actions of the executive for unconstitutionality in the course of deciding cases and controversies does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the Court has the power to invoke the Constitution to overcome sovereign immunity. As the cases leading up to Bivens, and Bivens itself, made clear, however, the "judicial power" in Article III includes the traditional powers of courts to find remedies for cognizable violations of rights. 92 Marbury rationalized judicial review by arguing that a court reviewing two sources of law, a statute and the Constitution, was bound to hold the one up against the other and resolve any conflict in favor of the higher authority, the Constitution. 93 While it is less traditional to undertake this comparison in the context of questions of allowing damages, if the only bar to a court finding a remedy against the government is a common law doctrine, sovereign immunity, then Marbury would indicate that constitutional necessity should take precedence. 94. One could argue that because sovereign immunity was understood to be an element of the judicial power at the time of the drafting of the Constitution, any limitations on that power would have been incorporated. The opinions of the majority of Justices in Chisholm, however, belie this contention. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text. Cf. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1163 (1996) (SouterJ., dissenting) (noting the "widespread agreement [among the Framers] that ratification would not itself entail a general reception of the common law of England").
95. Professor Schuck describes remedies Congress has allowed against the United States as "ajerry-built structure, a patchwork, a doctrinal stew." Schuck, supra note 22, at 51.
96. Beyond the general waivers of sovereign immunity contained in the legislation discussed in this section, namely, the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § § 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1994) , and the TuckerAct, 28 U.S.C. § § 1346(a), 1491(a)(1) (1994), Congress has specifically waived sovereign immunity for federal agencies in two important ways. First, Congress amended the Administrative Procedure Act in 1976 to waive sovereign immunity for suits against agencies for relief other than monetary damages. See 5 U.S.C. cem for preserving policymaking discretion and the ability of the executive to vigorously implement the law. 97 Despite ambiguous statutory language that could have allowed actions against the federal government for constitutional violations, courts have consistently interpreted waivers of sovereign immunity to foreclose this option. 98 a. The Court of Claims and the Tucker Act. -Congress began waiving federal sovereign immunity in 1855 with the establishment of the Court of Claims, which was empowered to hear government contract cases. 9 9 In 1887, the Tucker Act' 0 0 expanded the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to include, with some exceptions, all "claims founded upon the Constitution of the United States or any law of Congress." x0 ' The Tucker § 702 (1994). This waiver only applies to injunctions blocking unconstitutional acts before or while they occur, it is of no avail to a plaintiff seeking damages for constitutional violations after the fact.
Second, Congress has included in many statutes that establish agencies a "sue-and-besued" clause which the Court regularly interprets to effect a broad waiver of sovereign immunity. Rev. 771 (1995) (critiquing the Supreme Court's strong "clear statement rule" for waivers of sovereign immunity). This broad waiver, however, has not been found to afford a plaintiff a remedy in damages against the agency for constitutional violations. The Court in Meyer, despite finding that the sue-and-be-sued clause at issue waived sovereign immunity for constitutional torts, held that the waiver was not sufficient to create a cause of action. Instead, it found that a cause of action would require a separatejudicial fiat. See Meyer, 114 S. Ct. at 1005. For a discussion of Meyer, and its significance in providing the Court's rationale for not creating causes of action against the federal government, see infra text accompanying notes 121-132.
Congress has also consented to suit against the United States in specified land disputes, see 28 U.S.C. § § 2409-2410 (1994); for patent and copyright infringement, see 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1994); in certain disputes with contractors, see 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) (2) (1994); for specified claims by Indian tribes, see 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1994) 106. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994) (providing that there is no waiver of sovereign immunity for any "claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused"). See generally William P. Kratzke, The Supreme Court's Recent Overhaul of the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 7 Admin. LJ. 1 (1993) (surveying the evolution of the judiciary's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a)).
In the FTCA, Congress retained sovereign immunity in a few other specified instances. allowing tort suits to be the vehicle for testing the consequences of policymaking. 10 7 The federal government will be immune from liability in tort if the contested act "involves an element of judgment or choice"' 108 based on considerations of public policy. 10 9 This immunity applies to the discretionary acts of even the lowest-level official. 110 Courts have generally rejected arguments for recognizing a remedy for constitutional torts under the FTCA. The Supreme Court in FDIC v. Meyer"' held that the reference to "the law of the place" in the FTCA's jurisdictional provision" 2 only encompasses violations that arise out of state law. (noting that purpose of discretionary function exception is to "prevent judicial 'secondguessing' of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort").
108. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536. 109. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323; Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537. The Court in Gaubert explained the distinction between discretionary functions immune from tort liability and discretionary functions for which the Federal Tort Claims Act allow relief with a hypothetical involving the negligent driving of a car by a government agent. Even though driving a car requires the "constant exercise of discretion," that discretion is not grounded in policy, and thus any negligence that derives from the actions of that agent creates liability. See Gaubert 499 U.S. at 325 n. Meyer was whether the FTCA-and its enumerated exceptions-was the exclusive remedy for alleged constitutional violations, or whether the plaintiff could sue the FSLIC (the predecessor agency to the FDIC) under the agency's own sue-and-be-sued clause. See id. In other words, the plaintiff was seeking to avail himself of the broader waiver provision of the sue-and-be-sued clause, rather than relying on the narrow constrictions of the FTCA. The FCA is the exclusive remedy for all claims which are "cognizable" under its waiver of sovereign immunity, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994). This means that any suit found to be cognizable under the statute must be against the government as a whole and not against the particular agency. Congress so mandated in order to place the tort liability of those agencies with sue-and-be-sued clauses on the same footing as those without. See Meyer, 114 S. Ct. at 1000 (citing Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 562 (1988)). Claims to be cognizable under the FTCA must arise "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Because a private person could not be liable for a violation of the Constitution, and because the "law of the place" refers to state substantive law, the Court found that a constitutional tort is not cognizable under the FTCA. The Supreme Court thus held that the sue-and-be-sued clause was not supplanted by the F'CA, allowed the plaintiff to sue the FSLIC directly under the agency's sue-and-be-sued waiver of sovereign immunity. 115 Congress did not address governmental liability for constitutional violations at the time of the passage of the FTCA," 6 and congressional attempts to waive sovereign immunity for constitutional torts since the Court created the cause of action in Bivens have failed. When Congress recently amended the FTCA to substitute the United States as a defendant in certain tort actions, 1 1 7 it stated that the substitution "does not extend or apply to civil action against an employee of the Government which is brought for a violation of the Constitution of the United States.""1 8 It has been argued that the exclusion of constitutional torts was merely a political accommodation," 9 but the fact remains that at- 119. Byse argues that the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Judiciary Committee, in considering the bill to overturn Westfa!/, made a political decision to avoid disputes between the Justice Department and civil liberties organizations. See Byse, supra note 118, at 286-87. In order to avoid this political quagmire, the then-chairperson of the Subcommittee, Representative Barney Frank, DMass., sought a bill that would specifically exclude constitutional torts. The Committee's decision to avoid constitutional torts, then, was not a question of a deliberated choice to retain sovereign immunity for constitutional violations, but rather a reflection of legislative expediency. One could infer congressional intent to preclude constitutional torts from an affirmative act by Congress to bar such an action, but the inability to muster a majority to overcome the default presumption is not dispositive. Given the limits of Bivens and the failure of Congress to waive the sovereign immunity of the federal government for constitutional torts, plaintiffs have turned to the courts to create a cause of action against the government.
21 Courts have rejected this possibility, but have been terse in explaining the policies underlying their restraint. The Supreme Court rarely discusses its rationale for protecting the prerogative of Congress in deciding when to allow a suit against the federal government. Rather, the Court adheres to a few simple canons of interpretation. 122 In FDIC v. Meyer, however, the Court for the first time addressed a constitutional claim seeking a damage remedy against the United States, and the reasons it gave for not creating a cause of action provide insight into its unwillingness to challenge sovereign immunity.
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The plaintiff in Meyer alleged that his employment had been terminated without due process of law and sought damages under the Fifth . Meyer involved two inquiries by the Court: first, did the agency's sue-and-be-sued clause waive sovereign immunity for constitutional torts, and, if so, should there be a cause of action against the agency for constitutional violations? Having answered the first question in the affirmative, the next question became one entirely at the discretion of the Court. In other words, sovereign immunity had been waived, and the only question was whether it was appropriate for the Court, as it had done against individual officers in Bivens, to create a cause of action. The Court decided not to create a cause of action, thereby reinstating the immunity it had just decided had been waived. See id. at 1005. So, while the Court did not face the question of Whether to abrogate sovereign immunity directly, in deciding to forego the opportunity to create a cause of action for a constitutional violation, it laid out a concise argument for leaving questions of liability to Congress. In essence the Court restated the modem law of sovereign immunity, and the policy arguments the Court articulated for judicial restraint bear directly on the debate over judicially abrogating sovereign immunity. See infra Part I.
Amendment.
124 Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, relied on two policy arguments to defeat such a cause of action. First, he argued that creating a remedy against the United States "would mean the evisceration of the Bivens remedy" 25 because such a cause of action would undermine the incentive for an aggrieved plaintiff to sue the offending official. 126 The Court reasoned that any remedy against the United States would instead create an incentive to reach the deep pockets of the federal government. Federal officials would then essentially have nothing to fear in terms of personal liability. The deterrent effects of Bivens would thus be undermined. 127 Next, the Court found the potential expense of liability a "special factor[] counselling hesitation."
128 "If we were to recognize a direct action for damages against federal agencies," the Court argued, "we would be creating a potentially enormous financial burden for the Federal Government,"' 2 9 both in terms of actual liability and in the cost of defending such claims. The Court concluded by stating that it was the exclusive province of Congress to decide whether to embark on such a potentially significant expansion of governmental liability.' 3 0 The Court noted that Congress had tried several times to create such a cause of action, but 127. This rationale can be questioned on the practical ground that enterprise liability may have a greater deterrent effect than individual liability, even for government entities. See Schuck, supra note 22, at 102-06 (arguing that expanded governmental liability would increase general deterrence by focusing incentives on the location best able to respond to them). Furthermore, the Court's argument in Meyer about individual deterrence seriously misstates the purpose of Bivens, which focused on compensation more than the deterrent effects of personal liability. See Bandes, supra note 12, at 340-41 & n.244. Moreover, the current structure of liability for officials but immunity for the government for constitutional violations has other negative consequences. Professors Davis and Pierce note that sympathy for the plight of public employees leads to narrow interpretations of constitutional provisions, and leads juries to resolve close factual suits in favor of the defendant. See Peter L. (1982) ("Any decision on whether claims of the plaintiffs should be converted to a cause of action, however, should be reserved for Congress to make in these special circumstances. It is that body which must weigh the competing priorities and policy judgments to determine whether a cause of action should be created.").
failed. 131 Viewing this in terms of constitutional separation of powers, the Supreme Court can be seen as arguing that questions of the scope of liability are reserved for the accountable branch, and not for unaccountable, unelected judges.
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II. THE HUMAN RADIATION EXPERIMENTS As CONSTITUTIONAL MASS TORTS
The Human Radiation Experiments provide insights into the problems created by sovereign immunity. This Part first examines the history of the HRE, and the variety of ways in which the program violated fundamental rights. 133 It then distinguishes these violations from most constitutional torts by analogizing the HRE to mass torts, thus focusing on the responsibility of the government as a whole.
A. The History of the Human Radiation Experiments
The Human Radiation Experiments began in 1944 as an effort by the Manhattan Project, the federal government's World War II program to build an atomic weapon,'3 to understand the effects of radioactive materials on workers.' 35 Since the 1920s, the scientific community had recognized radium as a dangerous substance, understood to be responsible for the high incidence of bone disease observed among radium dial painters.1 3 6 It was unclear whether the materials the Manhattan Project 138 The AEC established a Division of Biology and Medicine, which had responsibility for biomedical research involving atomic energy.
13 9 The AEC sponsored a great variety of experiments well into the 1970s, and a large, secret bureaucracy grew up around the evaluation of the effects of radiation on human beings. 140 This bureaucracy continued in one form or another for almost four decades, until 1974.141
The facts alleged in recently filed cases illustrate the scope and nature of the experiments. In In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation, the plaintiffs allege that from 1960 to 1972 experiments were conducted under the auspices of the Department of Defense Atomic Support Agency at two hospitals in Cincinnati, Ohio.
142 Defendants exposed the subjects-ordinary patients-to total or partial body irradiation in order" 'to develop a baseline for determining how much radiation exposure was too much, ... to determine how shielding could decrease the deleterious effect of the radiation,'" and to determine what effect radiation had on " 'cognitive or other functions mediated through the central nervous system.' "143 Each subject, although suffering from cancer, was deemed to be in good clinical condition.
4 4 Plaintiffs further allege that subjects were selected because they were indigent, poorly educated or of below-average intelligence, and that the majority were African-American. 145 Patients were told they were receiving treatment, but the primary effects of the exposure appear to have been seriously shortened life expectancy, bone marrow failure or suppression, nausea, vomiting, burns on the subjects' bod- ies, severe and permanent pain, and emotional distress.' 46 No consent was garnered from any subject for the first five years of the trial, and thereafter consent was sought without giving the subjects information about the real risks involved.' 47 In Shattuck v. MIT, 48 former involuntary residents at the Walter E. Fernald State School in Waltham, Massachusetts allege that they were the victims of experiments in the 1940s and 1950s using radioactive isotopes fed to them without their knowledge. 149 The victims, retarded minors in the care of the state, were recruited to participate in the experiments under the guise of a "Science Club" and were told that they were advancing the cause of science without being told the particulars of the experiment.' 50 Scientists enticed the subjects into the experiments with rewards like Mickey Mouse watches, Christmas parties, and trips to baseball games.1 5 1 The AEC allegedly allowed additional doses of radioactive material to be administered to more severely handicapped children, those deemed "mentally deficient.' The tests were meant to investigate the effects of ionizing radiation on spermatogenesis in employees of nuclear weapons facilities after an accident in April 1962 at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in Richland, Washington.1 5 The government was also concerned about the effects of ionizing radiation on astronauts and/or pilots of a proposed nuclear-powered airplane.' 56 
B. Violations of the Constitution by the Human Radiation Experiments
Plaintiffs in these cases assert a number of constitutional claims, particularly arising out of due process, equal protection, and the right under the Eighth Amendment of prisoners to be free of cruel and unusual pun- 59 raises equal protection concerns. Finally, plaintiffs have raised a number of procedural due process claims arising from the secrecy surrounding the projects, and the fact that such secrecy denied them the right to pursue state law claims. 160 Together these constitutional claims represent assertions that federal officials overstepped the bounds of their limited authority and used victims as means to ends without their full knowledge or consent.
The claims addressed by the court in In re Cincinnati Radiation Litigation' 6 ' are illustrative. 162 First, and most compellingly, the Court 157. See, e.g., Shattuck Class Action Complaint, supra note 149, at 1-2, 4 (describing plaintiffs as "human guinea pigs in a series of dangerous, coercive, painful and unproven experiments" and asserting that the "defendants' actions were in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution").
158. See Bibeau Class Action Complaint, supra note 154, 'at 5-6 (asserting that all victims in one class were prisoners and wards of the State of Oregon).
159. See In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796, 828 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (discussing assertion of plaintiffs that subjects of radiation experiments were intentionally drawn from African-American patients).
160. See, e.g., Bibeau Class Action Complaint, supra note 154, at 33-34 (alleging that the defendants, by concealing and/or destroying information, deprived plaintiffs of their property rights without due process and their right of access to the courts).
161. 874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995). 162. These claims were analyzed in the process of determining whether defendants could assert qualified immunity as a defense to § 1983 and Bivens charges. Finding their actions clearly unconstitutional, the court held that the defendants could not assert qualified immunity. See id. at 814. The court further relied on the argument that an official can only garner immunity for acting within the scope of delegated authority, and found that "instigation of and participation in the Human Radiation Experiments were acts far beyond the scope of their delegated powers." Id.
Judge Beckwith also discussed the relevance of the Nuremberg Code to the asserted immunity of the defendants. The United States military played an instrumental role in the criminal prosecution of Nazi officials who experimented with human subjects during the Second World War ... and the standards that the Nuremberg Military Tribunals developed to judge the behavior of the defendants stated that the "voluntary found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged a violation of the substantive due process right to bodily integrity to survive a qualified immunity defense. 163 In answer to the defendants' argument that the subjects had been voluntary patients, the court countered that many of the patients, as indigents, had access only to the hospital where the experiments were taking place and were never informed of the nature of the experiments or their attendant risks.' 6 4 Finally, the court discussed the long line of cases finding a liberty interest in refusing state-sponsored invasive medical procedures. 165 The court had little difficulty in finding a violation of the plaintiffs' liberty interest, with no state interest sufficiently compelling to overcome the claim. court, this was sufficient to support a cause of action. 169 The plaintiffs also asserted a related procedural due process claim, under the theory that the concealment of the experiments impaired their ability to pursue a wrongful death claim under Ohio law, which requires that such claims be commenced within two years after the decedent's death. 170 Again, the court found merit in their claim, noting that the Supreme Court has affirmed that "a cause of action is a species of property protected by the ... Due Process Clause.' 71 Finally, the plaintiffs asserted an equal protection claim, pointing to the fact that the majority of subjects were African-American. 172 The court found that the allegations were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, although it noted that there were significant factual issues in contention about the defendants' knowledge and intent with regard to the recruitment of subjects.' 73 HRE cases that have not yet proceeded to trial present other constitutional claims. The plaintiffs in Bibeau, prisoners whose testes were exposed to radiation, assert a claim under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 174 In Mousso v. University of Rochester, 175 plaintiffs, subjects of plutonium injections at the University of Rochester, assert a creative claim for violation of the Fourth Amendment's proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures, and a more traditional claim for violation of the right to privacy. 176 It is unclear how these claims will fare in court. On a fundamental level, however, the practice of secretly experimenting on unconsenting subjects represents governmental action that violates the Constitution.
C. Defining Constitutional Mass Torts
If, as just explored, the Human Radiation Experiments are constitutional torts, they can reveal much about the limitations of the current regime of sovereign immunity for such violations. Typical Bivens claims arise out of the individual actions of federal officials, and therefore resemble traditional common law torts. 177. For a discussion of the development of constitutional torts by analogy to common law torts, see supra text accompanying notes 37-45. HRE, however, calls for a type of liability that is closer to that imposed in mass tort situations. Individual officers have the ability to hide behind the facade of a massive bureaucracy and to shield their actions from disclosure for decades. In such a situation, courts should focus on the institutional responsibility of the government as a whole, and not on the actions of the particular officers who implemented the policy. This section will discuss the shift in the law of torts from liability that derives from individual action to liability that arises from the actions of large institutions, and argue that a policy such as the HRE produces constitutional torts that are much more akin to mass torts and as such are appropriately resolved by the imposition of institutional liability. This section will consider the development of the law of mass torts as a species of liability distinct from traditional common law torts. It will then lay out the salient characteristics of the HRE as a constitutional mass tort.
1. Torts and Mass Torts. -Paradigmatic tort cases involve individual plaintiffs suing individual defendants, seeking compensation for the invasion of their rights. 178 In the last several decades, courts have been increasingly confronted with injuries that arise out of institutional conduct affecting vast numbers of plaintiffs, in actions that are described as "mass Some cases present issues of indeterminate defendants, where it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine which of the wrongdoers before the court caused the specific harm to the plaintiff, even when the nature of the harm is clear.' 8 3 Conversely, mass torts sometimes involve indeterminate plaintiffs, where it is unclear exactly who in a population has been 178. Traditional tort law encompasses both intentional violations of the rights of another as well as harm arising out of negligence. The elements of a common law tort include a duty-e.g., the duty of care-that is breached, causing injury where the causal link between that violation and the injury is legally cognizable. Courts faced with mass torts have significantly altered traditional conceptions of tort liability with theories such as enterprise and market share liability, which focus on the role that institutions play in creating wide-scale injuries. 185 Instead of inquiring into whether the plaintiff's injuries are directly attributable to a given defendant, courts look to the role the defendant played in marketing a product and exposing consumers to its risks. 86 Moreover, courts faced with mass torts relax traditional notions of causation, which require the plaintiff to prove that the particular defendant was more likely than not to have caused the particular injury. In mass tort cases, which often arise out of exposure to toxic or carcinogenic substances,' 8 7 injuries may manifest themselves years or decades after exposure, and can often be difficult to disaggregate from the background incidence of the disease without exposure.' the Human Radiation Experiments present claims that more closely resemble mass torts. Consequently, the institutional focus that has developed in mass tort law provides a useful way of analyzing the salient characteristics of these "constitutional mass torts."' 9 0
First, and foremost, the HRE was initiated and maintained as part of a long-standing and far-reaching policy of government-sponsored experimentation on human beings, and was not the product of the individual action of a single official.' 91 The initial decision to begin experimenta- 190. The term "constitutional mass torts" used in this Note is not meant to imply a direct parallel to the law of mass torts in terms of issues such as the exact scope of enterprise liability or theories of compensable injuries, e.g., increased risk of disease or diminution in quality of life, that have arisen out of mass tort litigation. See Weinstein, supra note 179, at 152-54. Rather, the analogy to mass torts primarily serves to shift the focus of the debate about sovereign liability from individual wrongdoers to institutional actions, in the same way that the traditional focus of the law of torts has shifted for mass torts. 191. See Advisory Comm. Final Report, supra note 3, at 22-42. tion was made by the advisory board to the Manhattan Project' 92 after consultation with scientists, military officials, and doctors. 193 After the completion of the Manhattan Project, the experiments were continued by the newly formed Atomic Energy Commission, which eventually became the Department of Energy.' 94 Other experiments involved the Department of Defense and the predecessor to the Department of Health and Human Services, and may have implicated the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Central Intelligence Agency.' 95 Not only was the program large in terms of the number of agencies involved, it was also long-lasting, continuing for thirty years and spanning six presidential administrations. Moreover, the experiments were not restricted to one facility. Instead, they took place at universities and hospitals all over the country, including the Universities of Rochester, Chicago and California, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 196 More than 2000 human radiation experiments were conducted at Veterans' Administration facilities, in conjunction with neighboring medical schools. 197 In terms of the magnitude of the violation, the FIRE were truly mass in scale.
Next, the HRE were conducted in total secrecy. As a matter of national security, all information about the enterprise was classified, and even congressional attempts to secure the release of data proved fruitless.' 98 In fact, when the first experiments were conducted using plutonium, the word plutonium itself was still classified. 199 The total secrecy surrounding the project effectively prevented any public discourse about the policy and circumvented the normal machinery of political accountability. 20 0 Moreover, this secrecy operated to complicate the identification of causal links between individual plaintiffs and particular responsible of- Finally, the type of policy at issue involved complex technical and scientific issues, not easily analogized to common law torts. 20 2 In some cases, where records have not been destroyed or lost or the victims are otherwise easily identifiable, it is possible to trace the wrongdoing to an individual doctor or official. 203 Nevertheless, there are instances in the HRE, such as open air releases of radiation, 20 4 in which the kinds of difficult questions of latency and multiple causation that drive the modem law of substantive liability in the context of mass torts will predominate.
2 0 5 Moreover, the clandestine nature of the program, and the fact that it was kept hidden for so long, contribute to the difficulty of linking individual victims to individual wrongdoers. This indeterminacy strains the analogy between traditional tort liability that underlies most Bivens cases and the constitutional violations represented by the HRE. In sum, all of these characteristics underscore the fact that the HRE represented institutional action, carried out over the span of decades, with the 201. Judge Weinstein offers an evaluative scheme of mass torts based on three axes: the clarity of the causal connection between the plaintiff and the defendant, whether the incident was part of a single event or multiple events, and whether the injuries were proximate in time and place. See Weinstein, supra note 179, at 15-19. The federal government's secrecy arguably shifted how one would characterize the IRE on two of Judge Weinstein's three axes, in that it obscured the identity of some defendants and hid the proximity of the injuries for decades. Both of these shifts complicate the judicial task of determining liability.
202. At the same time, however, some individual experiments do parallel certain traditional torts. Certainly the act of an individual scientist injecting plutonium into an individual subject without consent has an element of the traditional tort of battery. Mass torts, however, can arise out of the aggregation of what would otherwise be individual torts. See, e.g., In re Fed. Skywalk Cases, 93 F.R.D. 415 (W.D. Mo.) (mass tort case arising from collapse of a skywalk in a Kansas City hotel), vacated, remanded, 680 F.2d 1175, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982) . In other words, in the common law context, what is different about a mass tort can simply be a factor of scale.
It should also be noted that the FTCA does not waive the sovereign immunity of the federal government for many intentional torts, including battery. See supra note 106. It is for this reason that it is important to consider the constitutional violations, and notjust the traditional torts, that arose out of the HRE. As a matter of practice, the Court will strive to avoid constitutional questions if an issue before it can be resolved in any other way. See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464, 472 (1994) (noting the canon of construction that statutes will be construed to avoid constitutional questions); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 190-91 (1991) (same). In instances where the actions of government officials can be characterized as common law torts and violations of the constitution, this traditional canon would tie the vindication of all tort-like constitutional protections to the scope of the parallel common law action. full resources of the federal government. In the context of such a policy, sovereign immunity should be reexamined.
III. PROPOSAL: JUDICIAL ABROGATION OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL MASS TORTS
The Human Radiation Experiments illustrate the limits created by Congress's retention of sovereign immunity for constitutional torts and the Court's reluctance to create a cause of action against the federal government in such cases. Courts presented with arguments for abrogating sovereign immunity refuse to open the lid of a potential Pandora's box of liability, but in so doing bar recovery in those cases where it is truly appropriate. In most Bivens actions, where individual officers violate the rights of a few victims, such caution has merit. Constitutional mass torts, however, as exemplified by the HRE, present claims in which the rationales that underlie judicial restraint are less compelling. This Part will discuss the necessity ofjudicial action in the absence of a response by the political branches to constitutional violations. It will then discuss the power of the court to create a remedy in this context. Finally, it will lay out criteria based on the facts of the HRE to define a distinct and narrow category of cases in which the Court can create an exception to its all-or-nothing approach to sovereign immunity.
A. The Absence of a Remedy from the Political Process
Congress has the power to compensate the victims of the Human Radiation Experiments, as it has done for the victims of some mass torts, 20 6 or it could waive sovereign immunity in this instance and allow suits against the United States to go forward. 20 7 The HRE, however, have not yet generated widespread calls for congressional action; 208 this may be attributable to the fact that the experiments occurred decades ago and 206. See id. at 123 (listing government programs for black lung, atomic energy, and vaccines). But see id. at 163 (arguing that an administrative remedy for mass torts, in the absence of a strong independent bar and bench, often deteriorates due to lack of funds or capture by specific economic interests). It should be noted that the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1994), the government's atomic energy compensation plan, is at issue in some of the suits arising out of the HRE. The Price-Anderson Act indemnifies contractors for "nuclear incidents." 42 U.S. In approaching claims for recognizing a Bivens cause of action, the Court gives great weight to the existence and adequacy of remedial schemes created by the political branches.
2 1 0 This deference is animated by concern that judicially-created remedies might interfere with spheres of congressional authority and existing, carefully crafted, remedial schemes.
2 1 ' In the context ofjudicial abrogation of sovereign immunity, the fact that the political branches have not provided a remedy supports judicial intervention, and allays concerns about interfering with existing remedial schemes.
2 12 If Congress or the executive branch responds to the constitutional violations arising from the HRE, the need for judicial abrogation of sovereign immunity would be obviated. As it stands, however, if the Court chooses to defer to the silence of the political branches, the victims of the HRE will be left with no remedy against the government.
13
On a more fundamental level, relying on the political branches for a remedy when constitutional torts have occurred leaves decisions about the vindication of rights entirely to the very institutions that might have violated them. The political process does yield remedies, 2 14 and where the political process is functioning, such remedies will obviate the need for judicial action. But the fact that remedies are sometimes provided is not dispositive in those instances in which a remedy is not provided. As 
B. The Power of the Court to Modify Sovereign Immunity in the Absence of Congressional Authorization
While there is an academic consensus that the Court has the power to abrogate sovereign immunity, no federal court has exercised this power. 2 16 There are several questions raised by the assertion that the Court can provide a remedy in damages for constitutional violations: does the Court have the power to create a cause of action; does the Court have the power to abrogate sovereign immunity; and, finally, can the Court enforce any order for damages against a coordinate branch in the absence of prior consent?
The initial question of the power of the Court to infer a cause of action from the substantive protections of the Constitution arguably was settled in Bivens. 21 7 Although the Court did not create a cause of action against the government, its holding that the Constitution can afford a remedy in the absence of a statutory cause of action should apply regardless of whether the defendant is the government or a government official.
The judicial power to abrogate sovereign immunity, given the tenacity of the doctrine, presents a more difficult question. It is perhaps too simple to note that sovereign immunity is a common law doctrine, not based on the text of the Constitution, and that constitutional authority should be supreme over the common lawY' Certainly the traditional preference for legal remedies over equitable remedies, see supra note 30, underscores the concept that providing damages interferes less with the parties before the court.
tion, and the answer appears to be that the Court is not bound under the Constitution by more than stare decisis.
220
Stare decisis is, of course, a strong factor weighing against judicial action. The Supreme Court regularly construes sovereign immunity in favor of the sovereign, 22 ' and such consistency from the Court might reasonably create the expectation in the political branches that the doctrine will not suddenly, and significantly, shift. Moreover, as a practical matter, the current sentiment of the Court is decidedly protective of the doctrine. 2 The Court has never imposed a remedy on the United States in the absence of congressional authorization because the traditional view of sovereign immunity has allowed the Court to avoid the conflict. But if the Article III judicial power includes the power to create damage remedies, 229 then theoretically any remedy created to vindicate constitutional rights would obligate Congress to comply. Congress could refuse to act, and the Court would have no recourse to compel it to do so, 2 30 but in such a case it would be clear that Congress was acting contrary to the mandate of a constitutional decision. This is certainly a risk whenever the Court orders the United States to fulfill any of its statutory or common law obligations, but the fear of such defiance should not prevent the contemplation of a remedy. 23 ' the Appropriations Clause is not an absolute limit on the federal judicial power. The Supreme Court concluded in Glidden that "if ability to enforce judgments were made a criterion ofjudicia power, no tribunal created under Article III would be able to assume jurisdiction of money claims against the United States." 370 U.S. at 570. Certainly, as the Court discussed in FDIC v. Meyer, 114 S. Ct. 996, 1005-06 (1994), the potential liability of the United States is a strong factor counselling hesitation, but it is not a constitutional bar to the creation of a remedy. 227. See Stith, supra note 225, at 1350-51 (noting that Congress must provide public funds for constitutionally mandated activities and the independent constitutional activity of the President). An example of this is found in the constitutional imperative that the President "receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for. which he shall have been elected." U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 7. The Constitution, then, does not allow Congress to refuse to appropriate funds for the President's salary.
228. The Court has long had the power to mandamus officers to make direct payments from government funds, as long as the fiction was maintained that the suit was against the officer for the injunction, rather than against the government in its sovereign capacity. SeeJaffe, supra note 71, at 82. There is also an old tradition of suits by taxpayers to force the return of excessive payments. See endorsed by the Supreme Court could be eviscerated. The Court's articulation of the need to avoid the perils of second-guessing the political process is grounded in a healthy understanding of its limited role in a tripartite system. 23 4 The Court's all-or-nothing approach, however, forecloses an independentjudicial response to egregious abuses of power like the HRE. A balance must be struck enabling the Court to move away from its current position of uncritically protecting sovereign immunity without sacrificing the respect for coordinate branches that underlies the doctrine in the bulk of cases. Constitutional mass torts present a narrow category of claims that are compelling enough for judicial abrogation, but defined clearly enough to avoid the constitutionalization of all policy disputes. Experimenting on unwitting subjects in the HRE was clearly unconstitutional at the time, and was conducted in secret on an institutional level across the broad spectrum of government. 23 5 When considered in light of the rationales the Court has given for not creating a cause of action against the United States, these characteristics present a compelling argument in favor of abrogating sovereign immunity. This section will discuss considerations that should serve as limiting principles to enNote, then, will proceed under the assumption that the choice courts make not to create a cause of action against the government for constitutional violations is not constitutionally mandated.
232. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 12, at 345-46. Bandes argues for what she calls a "self-executing" Constitution, whereby the question of individual rights of action for constitutional violations would be disconnected from the consent of the political branches. Her argument has force, but sweeps quite broadly. She advocates, for example, judicial review of the adequacy of remedies provided by the political branches. Given the extreme caution of the Court in treading on the prerogatives of the political branches and given the legitimate fear of constitutionalizing policy disputes, it is more appropriate to propose judicial intervention in a narrow category of cases where the balance between the duty of the Court to provide substantive meaning to constitutional protections outweighs the need to respect coordinate branches that underlies current sovereign immunity doctrine.
233. See, e.g., Travis, supra note 12, at 667 ("[T]he Court's 'responsibility to assure the vindication of constitutional interests' is even greater when the injury is caused by unconstitutional government action." (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 407 (1971) (Harlan,J., concurring))). For further discussion, see infra note 243. By contrast, a constitutional tort that did not involve policy would arise from the actions of individual officials acting on their own initiative. Where, for example, a federal agent decides to search a criminal suspect's home without a proper warrant, such search might violate the Fourth Amendment, but not necessarily indicate any larger policy of warrantless searches. sure that the remedy, once created, does not expand beyond its necessary boundaries.
Constitutional Violations Versus Policy or Actions that Generate Common Law
Torts. -The presence of a constitutional, as opposed to a common law, violation is essential for the Court to consider abrogating sovereign immunity. The retention of sovereign immunity in the discretionary function exception to the Federal Torts Claim Act 2 36 properly ensures that the propriety of typical governmental policymaking will not be reviewed by the judiciary under the "reasonableness" inquiry applied in common law tort claims.
23 7 Government must be afforded a certain latitude in its policymaking and implementation, and courts are properly cautious in treading on this allocation of power. This rationale is less compelling in the context of violations of the Constitution. 238 Traditional tort liability is concerned primarily with compensation and deterrence, while constitutional tort liability is also concerned with reinforcing constitutional norms, protecting the rule of law, bolstering governmental legitimacy, and protecting the individual from the excesses of the will of the majority. 23 9 The Court has stated that 236. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1994). 237. See, e.g., United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand, C.J.) (presenting a formula for a reasonableness test as the function of the variables of the probability of risk, the gravity of the resulting injury, and the burden of adequate precaution).
238. The Court in the context of § 1983 actions has had to reconcile the availability of a damage remedy for deprivations of property and liberty with the possibility that such a remedy would transform every common law tort committed by a state or municipal official acting under the color of law into a constitutional tort. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 71, at 1268. To forestall this possibility, the Court has used § 1983 cases to sharply limit the constitutional definition of liberty and property, and to find a scienter element in constitutional torts cases. See id. at 1268-70. Certainly one negative consequence of a cause of action under the Constitution is the risk that courts will interpret the scope of constitutional protections narrowly in order to avoid liability. One response to this problem in the context of potential judicial abrogation of sovereign immunity would be to only allow damages where the constitutional provision at issue was clearly defined at the time of the wrongdoing. See 1986) , in which the Supreme Court held that there was no deprivation of due process arising out of the negligence of a prison official. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, stated that only conscious process could merit constitutional protection, and the negligent actions of officials, by definition, fall outside the scope of the Due Process Clause. "Far from an abuse of power," the Court noted, "lack of due care suggests no more than a failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person." Id. at 332.
242. See Schuck, supra note 22, at 100-18. 243. The Supreme Court has addressed liability arising out of policymaking, and the inadequacy of respondeat superior liability, in the context of municipal liability under § 1983. In Monell v. Department of Social Savices, the Court found that as a matter of congressional intent municipalities could be liable only for constitutional torts arising "pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature." 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) . In explicitly precluding liability through respondeat superior, the Court looked to the language of the statute, and even more importantly to policy concerns arising out of any broader conception of governmental liability. Specifically, the Court raised the concern that the employee-employer relationship alone appeared insufficient to attach vicarious liability in the context of constitutional violations. See id. at 692. The policy must cause the injury, not the actions of an employee. See id. As noted, courts have also precluded respondeat superior liability in Bivens cases. See supra note 58.
The definition of what constitutes "policy" generated much litigation following Monell. Five paradigms of policy that generate liability have emerged: actions by a legislative body, actions by boards and agencies with delegated legislative authority, actions by those with final authority for making a decision, a governmental policy of inadequate training or supervision, and a "custom." See Gellhorn & Byse, supra note 127, at 1303-05 (quoting Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 8.5, at 447-54 (2d ed. 1994)).
Travis argues that the Court should abrogate sovereign immunity for all unconstitutional policymaking, along the lines that the Court adopted for municipal liability in Monell. See Travis, supra note 12, at 626-37. Rejecting governmental liability arising through respondeat superior from individual officials' wrongdoing in favor of the kind of enterprise liability for policymaking described in Monell is an important narrowing criteria in the decision to abrogate sovereign immunity. Using policymaking, however, as the sole criterion for judicial abrogation, as Travis urges, would sweep too broadly. There are a number of grounds on which a piece of legislation or an administrative action can be found unconstitutional, from defects in procedural due process, see, e.g., Goldberg v.
Bivens and its progeny made clear, a cause of action under the Constitution should only be recognized when absolutely necessary. 244 Given their scope and complexity, constitutional mass torts are less likely to yield remedies through individual suits against individual officers than typical Bivens cases, which involve the kind of individual interaction characteristic of traditional torts. 245 What is "mass" about cases like the HRE is not simply that the rights of so many individuals were violated-although this certainly makes the necessity ofjudicial response in the absence of a congressional remedy more compelling-but also that an undertaking the size of the HRE allows responsible officials to hide behind the facade of a massive governmental bureaucracy.
46
Second, the Supreme Court is concerned about preserving the incentive effects of suits against individual officers. 2 47 In cases like the HRE, where policy was crafted at a high level of authority and implemented on a wide scale, such deterrence has to take place at an institutional level. Most Bivens actions arise in the context of individual federal employees and officers who overreach the scope of their delegated authority. 248 When looking to the values of protecting constitutional integrity, there is much less incentive for the Court to impose a remedy against the government where it can be found that the wrongdoing occurred as the result of an isolated incident or by the hand of an individual tortfeasor. 2 49 The Court should be concerned most about those situations in which a clearly adopted policy or custom works to violate constitutional rights, and the more widely adopted the policy, the greater the Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (holding that a state that terminates public assistance benefits without a hearing denies the recipient procedural due process), to overreaching of congressional power, see, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (invalidating Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1994), as exceeding congressional power under the Commerce Clause). Any court should be wary of creating a damage remedy against a coordinate branch without a clearer sense of which violations of the Constitution might merit judicial action. See Davis, supra note 12, at 71 ("Almost every business in the country was adversely affected in some way by the National Industrial Recovery Act the Court held unconstitutional in A. LA 249. This is not to say that Congress should not consider transferring the liability of an officer who violates the Constitution to the United States as a means of better ensuring compensation for constitutional violations. Whether any aggrieved plaintiff would pursue a claim against an official when they could recover against the state, however, is debatable, and in such a situation, administrative or legislative remedies against the offending official might be necessary to ensure deterrence. See Madden et al., supra note 120, at 486-89 (arguing for administrative remedies against officials in the event that sovereign immunity were waived for constitutional torts).
incentive to act. Focusing on abrogating sovereign immunity only where policy is concerned ensures that, on a practical level, incentive effects are properly targeted at the institutional mechanisms that can prevent abuse. In other words, if the government is liable, those in control of policyeither in Congress or in the executive branch-will have a much greater incentive to ensure that the entity for which they are responsible minimizes the potential for abuse.
0
Finally, limiting abrogation of sovereign immunity to liability arising from policymaking better reflects the role of the Court in upholding the structural protections of the Constitution.2 1 Unlike private institutions, public entities must balance more than risk of harm into any analysis of the costs and benefits of a course of action. A governmental actor must also consider the values and policy choices that its actions represent,
The Court should only act in those cases where liability arises out of clearly understood constitutional principles. A suit for damages is not the venue for the Court to articulate constitutional doctrine for the first time. Limiting causes of action to clear constitutional violations responds to the Court's concern about creating potentially vast liability. As the context of suits against officers has shown, the qualified immunity standard disposes of the bulk of cases filed each year at the procedural stage of a motion to dismiss. 255 Only acting where the violation is clear will limit the number of constitutional claims courts have to decide, and ensure that only claims arising from the most egregious violations survive the pleading stage.
56
Courts have recognized in other contexts that it is fundamentally unfair to impose liability in the absence of a clear indication of the normative bounds within which parties are supposed to act, and the same insight should apply when the Court contemplates creating new sources of liability for the federal government. 255. Cf. Rosen, supra note 15, at 353 (noting that the Supreme Court has "warned the lower courts to apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure firmly, so as to ensure that insubstantial Bivens suits were dismissed at the initial stages of the litigation").
256. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (arguing that qualified immunity "should avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment").
257. In the context of administrative actions, courts have held that under the Due Process Clause, new substantive liability should only cut off the rights of a party where adequate notice has been given. See General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (refusing, under the Due Process Clause, to allow the agency to impose a fine where the regulatory provision on which it was relying was ambiguous).
258. 457 U.S. 800 (1982) . 259. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64.
that the policy at issue was unconstitutional, the cause of action would be allowed.
Secret Policy Versus Policy Amenable to Political
Discourse. -The overriding policy rationale for the current regime of sovereign and official immunity is the protection of policymaking discretion.
2 60 In most cases, political checks remain on the exercise of power by the legislature and the executive in the absence of judicial remedies. 26 ' Policymaking and executive action that occur in secret, however, are not subject to such political checks. The HRE is illustrative.
2 6 2 From the inception of the program in 1944, through 1993, when the Secretary of Energy decided to reveal the experiments, 2 63 the political process could not function in any kind of meaningful way to correct the abuses inherent in the program. Moreover, none of its victims knew about the program or the source of the injuries they had received, and even the normal congressional oversight mechanism failed.
2 64 The political dynamic facing victims seeking redress from Congress decades after their injuries occurred is vastly different from the kind of vigorous public debate that ideally checks the exercise of power.
265
When a given policy is undertaken in secret, behind the shield of national security, it should merit greater scrutiny by the Court.
2 6 6 The to allow the President to operate under the constitutional grant of power as Commander-in-Chief outside the zone of hostilities without express congressional approval. 2 76 In Steel Seizure, the Court asserted a role, at least in the domestic arena, in ensuring that the executive acts within constitutional bounds. This suggests that, despite the invocation of national security, the Court will intervene if a coordinate branch clearly lacks constitutional authority. 277 If the impetus for the Court to interfere with the national security prerogatives of the executive is a question of the degree of the violation involved, cases like the HRE should fall on the Steel Seizure side of the Court's precedence, given the nature and extent of the executive wrongdoing at issue.
78
Where these criteria are met, as in the HRE, the Court should find a remedy against the United States under the Constitution in the absence of congressional action. Some fear a massive surge in suits if the Court creates a damage remedy against the United States for constitutional violations like the HRE.
2 79 Prudential judicial control over the scope of damages awarded and the contexts in which they would be granted, however, is a better way to control the scope of liability than a simple rule of sovereign immunity. Since the Court is interpreting the Constitution to create a damage remedy, it could tailor the remedy to balance compensa-tion with the need to protect the public fisc.
2 80 Moreover, the Court retains a number of threshold justiciability requirements-notably standing-that could be employed to limit the pool of potential claimants to those who were able to demonstrate an actual injury, fairly traceable to the government's actions. 2 81 The criteria for finding a constitutional mass tort provide one limiting factor to the fear of a flood of litigation, and the Court's ability to control the federal docket through the requirements of justiciability and by defining the scope of the remedy provides another.
CONCLUSION
Just as courts struggled to adapt traditional notions of tort liability to the new context of mass torts, they should recognize that in the context of constitutional torts there are situations where the paradigm of an individual officer violating the constitutional rights of an individual does not apply. In those cases, courts must move beyond current limits on constitutional liability. When the violation of individual rights arises out of longstanding, clearly-defined policy, backed by the vast resources of the federal government, in an environment cut off from the normal mechanisms of political oversight, courts should create a cause of action against 280. Nothing in the argument above should be read to undermine congressional power to act within the scope of its delegated authority to provide an alternative remedy that it considers equally effective to protect constitutional rights. See Dellinger, supra note 12, at 1546-49. Any congressional decision that effectively extended immunity would then be subject to bicameralism and presentment, see U.S. Const., art. I, § 7, in a way that the "decision" by silence not to waive sovereign immunity for constitutional violations is not.
Congressional action appropriately rests on popular political will. The Court, however, has been extremely careful to ensure that Congress will not affect the rights of individuals outside the legislative branch without the protection of bicameralism and presentment, see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), and it has been equally careful to construe congressional delegation to agencies narrowly so as to avoid unconstitutionality. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) .
281. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (laying out the constitutional minima of standing to sue in federal court as injury-in-fact, fairly traceable to the action of the defendant, redressable by a favorable decision). The Court's redressability requirement would be met in any damages action.
This raises an additional difficulty for constitutional mass torts like the HRE. One characteristic of a constitutional mass tort is the difficulty of connecting individual plaintiffs with those officers most directly involved in the decision to experiment. See supra text accompanying notes 191-205. Courts, when examining the justiciability of any individual plaintiff's claim, then, may have difficulty with the causation element of standing, and would have to approach this requirement with a certain degree of flexibility.
282. If a glut of constitutional claims exists that could meet the constitutional minima of justiciability and would be successful but for sovereign immunity, such a surfeit of grievances would appear to be an argument in favor of creating a remedy rather than perpetuating the remedy's absence. Moreover, as the experience with Bivens demonstrates, the Court has not allowed the possibility of personal liability under the Constitution to be abused. See supra note 15. There is no reason to believe that the Court could not exercise similar restraint in crafting a remedy against the United States, and ensure that meritless claims be weeded out at the earliest stage of pleading. the government. The question in a constitutional mass tort situation is not whether an individual official will be deterred, but whether the institution as a whole has mechanisms in place to ensure that wide-scale deprivations of constitutional rights do not occur.
Limiting the remedy to constitutional mass torts ensures the creation of a narrow exception to the current doctrine of sovereign immunity, not a wholesale abandonment of a generally workable regime. The Court believes that Congress, and by extension the political process, should be responsible for deciding questions of the allocation of the financial burden generated by governmental wrongdoing. Where the conditions described in this Note are met, however, the political process has broken down and there is little chance that a plaintiff will gain a meaningful remedy from the political branches. Judicial abrogation of sovereign immunity in that case should allow the Court to provide a remedy for an egregious breakdown of traditional constitutional protections without overreaching its position in the constitutional system or undermining the general protections it has built for vigorous governance. Despite the Court's recent pronouncement that the logic of Bivens does not support a remedy directly against the government, when the federal government does fundamental violence to the liberties of the citizens of the United States, the Constitution, and the judiciary's duty to uphold it, must overcome judicial caution.
